This article examines the evolution of ownership of cash flow rights and control of voting rights of firms that went public in Italy over the period . At the IPO, the ownership structure does not evolve towards a dispersed one. Even 10 years after the flotation, the initial ultimate shareholder retains the majority of voting rights. Though control is valuable, original owners do not systematically set up structures that dissociate cash flow from voting rights.
Introduction
Corporate ownership has been receiving growing attention by researchers. There is now substantial empirical evidence regarding the structure of corporate ownership around the world. From a comparative perspective, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) were among the first to document that the Anglo-American model of widely held corporation is far from being widespread. Faccio and Lang (2002) report that in Continental Europe the ultimate shareholder controls on average more than 43% of voting rights and in Italy, France, Germany and Austria retains majority control. Concentrated ownership is also pervasive in East Asian Countries. Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) find that more than 2/3 of listed companies are controlled by a single large shareholder. Even in the US, Holderness, Kroszner e Sheehan (1999) show that blockholdings are not a rare phenomenon.
These papers share the view of looking at ownership structures of listed companies at a specific point in time, regardless of how such structures arise. A significant change in the ownership structure is likely to occur when a company goes public. Undoubtedly the IPO represents a major event in the life of a company.
This study intends to add evidence on the ownership patterns of IPO firms. For all firms that went public in Italy over the period 1985-2005, I analyze the changes in ownership of cash flow rights and control of voting rights that occurred at the time of the IPO and up to 10 years after the flotation.
The question how ownership structure evolves is of special interest in Italy, where less firms are listed. The fear of losing control is ranked among the disadvantages of going public and may influence the propensity to list (Roell, 1996) . So the original owners may be particularly concerned about the ownership structure. When the original owners decide to go public, they make important decisions that impact on the ownership structure. By deciding what fraction of shares to sell, at which price and to whom, the original owners consider the effect that the going public decision will have not only on the post-IPO ownership structure, but also the implications for the following years.
So far, scant evidence exists on the dynamics of ownership. Mikkelson, Partch e Shah (1997) document the dynamics of ownership and performance of companies that went public in the US. Goergen and Renneboog (2003) analyze the evolution of control of IPO firms in Germany and UK. Ehrahdt and Nowak (2003) focus on German family-owned firms; Changyun (2005) , Hu and Goergen (2005) on Chinese companies.
A common approach of these studies is to examine the evolution of equity ownership of insiders, blockholders or new shareholders as a whole. I take a different view and analyze the ownership held by the ultimate shareholder. Specifically, I consider ownership of cash flow rights and control of voting rights held by the ultimate shareholder before the IPO and its dynamics after the flotation.
Existing literature reveals that not only does the concentration of shareholdings differ among countries, but so does the discrepancy between ultimate ownership and control. In countries in which controlling shareholders are common, control is often maintained while retaining less than the majority of cash flow rights.
If the original owners value control, they may try to "dilute" the investment necessary to hold the majority of votes. In other terms, they may desire to separate cash flow from voting rights. This can be done by the use of pyramidal structures, cross-shareholdings or dual-class shares. Bebchuk (1999) states that the incentive to separate ownership from control may be severe in countries with poor investor protection and large private benefits of control.
It turns out that, when the protection of minority shareholders is weak and private benefits of control are high: i) the original owners, when taking the company public, retain the majority of votes; ii) the ownership structure does not evolve towards a dispersed one; iii) the controlling shareholders have an incentive to separate cash flow from voting rights at the IPO or in the following years.
In this respect, Italy represents an ideal setting to examine the evolution of ownership and control. The discrepancy between cash flow and voting rights is perceived to be substantial among Italian companies. Faccio and Lang (2002) report an average ratio of cash flow to voting rights of 0.743 for Italy, the lowest among Western European corporations after Switzerland. Italy is also ranked among the countries with the poorest investors' protection (La Porta et al., 1998 ) and the highest level of private benefits (Nenova, 2003; Dyck and Zingales, 2004) . For example, Dyck and Zingales (2004) report an average control premium of 37% in Italy, the largest among industrialized countries, suggesting that private benefits account for a significant portion of firm value.
My findings show that the decision to go public is strongly affected by considerations of corporate control. Before the IPO initial ultimate owners control on average more than 70% of voting rights and when they take their company public do not lose control. Even ten years after the flotation initial owners still retain the majority of voting rights. Thus shareholdings are rather stable after the flotation, control is hardly contestable and transfers of control mainly occur on a friendly basis. Only 22% of IPO firms change control and most of them are companies controlled by a venture capitalist. Instead, families seem to value control most as they give up their majority stake with less frequency and when they preserve control in their hands, they also re-enter the capital market via a seasoned equity offering with less frequency.
Contrary to expectations, I also find that initial owners, though they value control, do not try to systematically separate cash flow from voting rights either at the IPO or in subsequent years. However the evidence varies across periods. Up to the late '80s, the IPO market is largely dominated by the flotation of business group-affiliated firms placed at the bottom of pyramidal groups controlled by historical families. State-owned companies and family firms also issue non voting shares at the IPO or in the following years. Beginning with early '90s such phenomenon comes to an end. IPO firms stop issuing non voting shares to dissociate cash flow from voting rights. The practice of listing carve-outs is also greatly reduced. Thus the evidence may reveal that the increased investors' protection has lowered the private benefits of control and thus the incentives to separate cash flow from voting rights.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 depicts the determinants of the decision to go public and the implications on ownership structure. Section 3 outlines the link between private benefits and the incentive to separate ownership from control. Section 4 describes data and methodology. Section 5 provides descriptive statistics and shows the ownership right before the IPO. Section 6 explores the initial public offering and the evolution of ownership structure immediately after the flotation. Changes of control and the evolution of ownership and control in the years following the IPO are shown in Section 7. Section 8 examines the re-enter of capital markets by IPO firms and its impact on ownership structure. Section 9 concludes.
Determinants of IPOs and implications for ownership structure
It is commonly believed that going public is a natural step in the life cycle of the firm. The owner-manager may decide to take the company public in order to raise capital to finance future growth opportunities. However in some countries few companies are listed and even in most developed markets some large companies remain private. So the decision to go public is a complex process and requires to trade off benefits against costs.
Access to new finance is usually the major motive that induces owner-managers to go public. That may be particularly true for high-growth companies, that are often financially constrained since the entrepreneur may not have sufficient personal wealth to finance the business. Once public, firms can easily go back to the public markets to raise more cash.
Conversely, in highly-leveraged firms, the flotation may help rebalance the capital structure. Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) document that the need to unlever the balance sheet has been the determinant of many IPOs that occurred in Italy in the late '80s.
As a by-product, flotation can help access debt capital on more favorable terms. Debt financing offers the bank a privileged source of information on the firm, allowing the intermediary to extract rent positions (Boot, 2000) . By going public, the firm releases information to general investors, stimulates the competition among potential lenders, ensures lower cost of debt or larger supply of funds, mitigating potential credit crunch (Rajan, 1992) . Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) do document that Italian companies have experienced a reduction in the cost of bank credit after the IPO.
Another reason for listing is liquidity provided by the enlargement of investors' base. Listing on an organized exchange allows to trade shares at a value that reflects all available information. Hence diffuse ownership has the effect to lower the cost of capital of the firm and increase the equilibrium price for the shares offered 15 . Not only is secondary-market liquidity valuable to investors but also to original shareholders, who may desire to dispose additional shares after the IPO (Booth and Chua, 1996) . Indeed the IPO offers existing shareholders the chance to diversify their wealth (Pagano, 1993) .
Recent literature highlights the importance of ownership structure and control issues in the IPO. In modeling the IPO process, the sale of new shares is designed with the final ownership structure in mind. When taking the company public, original shareholders face the choice of what fraction of shares to sell, at which price and to whom to sell.
In allocating shares, issuing firm can favor small or large investors, according to the target ownership structure original shareholders desire. Small investors own a tiny fraction of shares outstanding. Their objective is to maximize the risk-return profile of their portfolio. They have no power to individually influence management's choices and have no incentive to monitor managers, since they suffer a free rider's problem. So small investors tend to remain passive investors. Conversely, large investors own a large stake of company's shares and have a greater incentive to play an active role in corporate decisions, since they partially internalize the benefits from their monitoring effort. So most investors will remain relatively small, while others will seek a large block of shares and are prepared to assume an active role in firm's management. Given the objective of the entrepreneur about control after the IPO, the issuing firm will tend to discriminate between large and small investors.
A strand of literature analyzes the impact of IPO on ownership structure conjecturing that original shareholders desire to sell out, relinquishing control. Another set of papers assumes that the owner-manager goes public with the objective to maintain control. In any case, the sale of shares is conceived as a revenue-maximizing strategy for original owners.
IPOs and loss of control
In Stoughton and Zechner (1998) the maximization of the proceeds from the sale of stocks is achieved by allocating shares to large investors. Institutional investors provide monitoring on managers' activity that raises firm value. In order to induce active investors to buy shares at the IPO, the issuing firm has to generate underpricing. Their prediction does not seem to be supported by empirical evidence. For example, Brennan and Franks (1997) show that original shareholders try to avoid the formation of blockholders at the IPO. Stoughton and Zechner's (1998) model is consistent 15 The liquidity hypothesis was first formalized by Amihud and Mendelson (1986) , that derive asset returns as a concave and increasing function of the bid-ask spread. Therefore asset prices include the present value of all expected trading costs. Closely related is the notion that expected returns are reduced when more investors become aware of the firm's securities. The hypothesis finds its foundations in Merton's (1987) theory of equilibrium pricing with incomplete information. In Merton's words the rate of return depends on the "degree of investor recognition".
with the loss of control of original owners at the IPO. However the IPO can be a first stage in the sale of the company as argued by Zingales (1995) and Mello and Parsons (1998) .
If the owner-manager wishes to sell his company, he can: i) directly sell the firm with a direct bargain with a potential buyer; ii) take the company public and liquidate his shares in the IPO; iii) take the company public, sell an initial stake to small shareholders, retain control and then sell the block of shares by directly bargaining with a potential buyer. Zingales (1995) and Mello and Parsons (1998) show that it is best to first sell cash flow rights to small investors in the IPO and then directly negotiate the controlling block, including private benefits, with a large investor. In doing so, the owner-manager maximizes the revenues raised in the aggregate sale of shares 16 .
IPOs and retention of control
Brennan and Franks (1997), Pagano and Roell (1998) and Bebchuk (1999) each provide a model in which the initial owner values control in order to enjoy private benefits. So pre-IPO shareholders when taking the company public will design an ownership structure that preserves control in their hands. In Brennan and Franks (1997), firm's management, to retain control, underprices new shares to create excess demand. Oversubscription allows the directors to achieve a more diffuse shareholding by allowing discrimination against large investors. The more dispersed ownership reduces the incentive for outside investors to monitor the management and avoid the possibility of a hostile takeover 17 . Pagano and Roell (1998) also consider the agency costs arising from the separation of ownership and control. The founder, when selling a minority stake in the IPO, will allocate shares to small shareholders in order to avoid the overmonitoring of large investors which may pose too tight constraints on his ability to enjoy private benefits. Bebchuk (1999) argues that, when private benefits of control are large, the initial owner has no 16 The two models differ since in Mello and Parsons (1998) the seller obtains valuable information from the sale of shares to small investors that is useful in negotiating the terms of a sale to an active investor. Uncertainty about the value added by the active investor and uncertainty about the demand of small investors make the IPO an unavoidable step in the eventual sale of the company. While in Zingales (1995) the IPO stage may not even be optimal when the value of the cash flow rights under the management of a new large investor is less than the value under the initial owner. 17 Brennan and Franks (1997) provide evidence that in a sample of 69 UK IPOs, underpricing is used to generate oversubscription and then discriminate against blockholders. Underpricing costs are borne by non-directors, who sell in the IPO. Directors retain their shares in the IPO, but tend to dispose of their shares in subsequent years. Evidence from the US supportive of Brennan and Franks view can be found in Smart and Zutter (2003) . The authors analyze firms that go public with dual class shares (DCS). Initial owners use DCS to retain control. With no worry about control, the firm has no need to underprice according to Brennan and Franks theory. Smart and Zutter find that firms issuing shares with restricted voting rights in the IPO tend to be less underpriced than other IPOs and have larger shareholders.
incentive to create dispersed shareholdings since a rival will show up trying to gain control by purchasing a majority of shares in order to enjoy private benefits. So an initial setting of a dispersed ownership structure will not be a stable equilibrium and will not be chosen to begin with. The founder will then keep a lock of control even if that imposes diversification and liquidity costs. The initial owner can lower these costs by separating cash flow from voting rights, through the use of pyramids, dual class shares or cross-shareholdings. The argument that initial owners wish to retain control and then shape the firm governance accordingly is supported by some evidence also in the US. Field and Karpoff (2002) analyze 1019 IPOs of industrial firms and find that 53% of them adopt takeover defenses when they go public. Though such companies have a dispersed ownership after the IPO, contestability of control is significantly reduced and IPO management is insulated from the discipline of the market for corporate control.
Private benefits and conflicts of interests
Empirical literature indicates that, in a global context, concentrated ownership structures are more common than widely held corporations typical of US and UK. That posits a changing nature of the conflicts of interests between owners and controllers.
Starting with Jensen and Meckling (1976) , it has long been recognized that agency problems potentially arise when the original owner sells a fraction of the firm to outsiders.
In the typical anglo-american corporation, the conflict of interest involves management and dispersed shareholders 18 . The former has effective control over corporate decisions, while individual shareholders, who own a tiny fraction of firm's shares, are purely interested in maximizing the value of their stocks. They do not take an active role in the firm, since they have little or no incentive to expend significant resources to monitor managers or seek to influence decision-making within the firm. That leaves room for the management to pursue his own objectives, partially divergent from value maximization.
In a context of concentrated ownership, the controlling shareholder holds a significant portion of outstanding shares and generally takes an active role in running the company, by choosing the management and directly taking executive positions. That provides a greater alignment between management and controlling shareholders.
As a consequence, control is not contestable and transfers of blockholdings only occur on a friendly basis through a direct bargain with a potential acquirer. That creates some concern since it makes it hard to remove inefficient management. Controlling shareholder can easily become entrenched like managers of widely-held companies (Morck, Stangeland e Yeung, 2000) . In closely-held companies, ownership and control are fully coincident in the hands of controlling shareholder. That solves the agency problems of managerial firms. However, the conflict arises between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders, that provide equity capital but take no role in decision-making.
The controlling shareholder can exert a greater power on management to take decisions that maximize share value. These are the shared benefits of control enjoyed by all shareholders in proportion of shares held. However the controlling shareholder can use his control to consume private benefits, that is to extract corporate resources to his own exclusive advantage leading to a reduction in share value 19 . Empirical evidence reveals that the magnitude of private benefits vary substantially across countries (Nenova, 2003; Dyck and Zingales, 2004) , and in some countries private benefits can represent a significant portion of firm value. For example, Dyck and Zingales (2004) document that in Italy block premium is 37%, one of the highest values among developed countries (in France control premium equals 1.7%; in Germany 9.5%; while in the US and UK the value of control amounts respectively to 1.6% and 1.8%).
Though private benefits are not necessarily bad, blockholders can use their control to extract corporate resource expropriating the wealth of minority shareholders.
The consumption of private benefits can be detrimental for outside shareholders when (Belcredi and Caprio, 2004 ): i) outside investors cannot ex-ante anticipate the effect of private benefits' extraction and protect themselves by discounting the risk of expropriation into the price at which they are willing to hold company shares; ii) investor protection is weak and law enforcement of poor quality.
The assumption that large private benefits and expropriation of minority shareholders are correlated with a lax legal regime is pervasive in the literature (La Porta et al., 1997 Porta et al., , 1998 Bebchuk, 1999) and finds some empirical support. Nenova (2003) and Dyck and Zingales (2004) find that weak investors protection is associated with higher private benefits of control. 19 There is no unique definition of private benefits of control. They include perks consumption by top executives (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) , managerial shirking, excessive compensation of top managers. According to Dyck and Zingales (2004) , "the use of a company's money to pay for perquisites is the most visible but not the most important way in which corporate resources can be used to the sole (or main) advantage of the controlling party". A major source of private benefits are self-dealing transactions. Johnson et al. (2000) call "tunneling" the transfer of assets and profits from a company to his controlling shareholder. Private benefits also include "amenity potential" (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) like social prestige, political connections, media ownership and consequent influence on public opinion (Djankov et al., 2001) . It is worth noting that private benefits are not necessarily bad.
Separating ownership and control in closely-held firms
To the extent that control is valuable, the blockholder has an incentive to hold voting rights in excess of cash flow rights. That can be achieved in three basic ways (Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis, 2000) : issuing differential voting shares, creating pyramidal structure or using cross-shareholdings.
In a dual-class structure (DCS), the controlling shareholder retains shares with voting rights and issues shares with restricted voting (or non voting) rights to outside investors, thus deviating from the one share-one vote rule. So, for example, if a firm has 100 shares outstanding, of which 50 are non voting, the blockholder retains the majority of votes by holding 26 common shares. So cash flow rights are 26% and voting rights 52%.
In a pyramidal structure, a blockholder controls, for example, 51% of shares of firm A, which owns 51% of firm B, which owns 51% of firm C and so on. The blockholder at the top of the pyramid owns the majority of voting rights of all firms across the pyramid, with an increasingly small investment in each firm down the line. In firm B the shareholder owns 26% of cash flow rights (the product of ownership stakes along the line), while in firm C he owns 13.27% of cash flow rights.
Cross-holdings are intended that a company directly or indirectly controls its own stocks.
Separation of ownership from control via DCS, pyramids or cross-holdings is widespread around the world. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) and Faccio and Lang (2002) report that the use of devices separating cash flow from voting rights is common across European countries, though the discrepancy is particularly severe in some, Italy included. Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) also find that in East Asian countries, voting rights frequently exceed cash flow rights via pyramids and cross-holdings. In the US, control in excess of cash flow rights is achieved through dual-class shares and dual-class firms represent a significant niche (Smart and Zutter, 2003) .
Existing literature indicates that in Italy the high magnitude of private benefits and a lax legal regime make control valuable and provide incentives to controlling shareholders to separate ownership from control. Within this framework, the analysis of ownership structure of Italian IPOs and its evolution can help shed more light on this phenomenon.
It has to be noticed that several changes of the legal regime have taken place in Italy over the sample period analyzed in this paper. The main event is the passage in Italy of a corporate governance reform in 1998, also known as the Draghi reform. The reform established new rights granted to minority shareholders and enlarged the exercise of existing ones, introduced proxy fights, extended powers and duties of the board of auditors 20 . In 1999 Borsa Italiana issued the Code of Corporate Governance (further revised in 2003) aimed at fostering the proper functioning of the board of directors of listed companies (whose compliance is voluntary). Among other things, these reforms intended to strengthen minority shareholders' rights and thus limit the ability of controlling shareholders to extract private benefits. Indeed, Dyck and Zingales (2004) segment their data on Italy into those observations before and after July 1998 and find that before the reform the average value of private benefits was 47% , while after the reform it was reduced to 6% only.
Data and methodology
The dataset includes all companies that for the first time went public in Italy from 1985 to 2005 via an initial public offering. I exclude foreign companies, companies already listed on another market, companies that are spin-offs of other listed companies 21 . Over the sample period, 251 companies went public in Italy.
I hand-collected information about the ownership structure at the initial public offering (i.e. names of shareholders and stakes held) from the IPO prospectuses. Data on the offering (number of shares issued, type of shares, new shares vs. existing shares) were collected from the prospectuses as well as from the website of Borsa Italiana, the Italian Stock Exchange. The ownership structure after the IPO and up to the following 10 years was hand-collected from "Il taccuino dell'azionista", an annual publication edited by Il Sole 24 Ore. For most recent years ownership data are available on the website of Consob (the Italian Stock Exchange regulatory authority). In identifying the ultimate shareholder, I consider the mechanisms used to secure voting rights in excess of cash flow rights, that is non-voting shares, pyramids 22 and cross-holdings. So the ultimate 20 An analysis of the legal changes introduced by the 1998 reform can be find in Bianchi and Enriques (2001) . A wider view on the evolution of the legal environment in Italy is taken by Ferrarini (2005) and Aganin and Volpin (2005) . The two authors also evaluate the impact of the 1998 reform on the index of shareholder protection developed by La Porta et al.(1998) and find an improvement in shareholder protection from 1 (in 1994 as computed by La Porta et. al.) to 5 (6 is the maximum value the index can take). 21 I also exclude companies that went public on the Mercato Ristretto. 22 Faccio and Lang (2002) distinguish between pyramids, that is shareholder is the largest shareholder at the top of the control chain. I use information in the IPO prospectus as well as in the publication "Il taccuino dell'azionista" to trace the identity of the ultimate shareholder.
Ultimate shareholder holdings of shares and votes
To measure voting rights, I consider direct and indirect stakes in the company, that is stakes usually held through an unlisted company 23 . With respect to previous literature, I improve on the identification of ultimate shareholders. For example, Faccio and Lang (2002) , due to their large sample, have some limits in the identification of the ultimate shareholder because they fail to trace the owners of unlisted firms. I overcome this problem, since IPO prospectuses also report shareholders of unlisted firms which own stakes in the company going public. Based on information in the prospectus, I am also able to identify more carefully family members especially the spouse. Stakes held by family members are summed up and the family is considered the largest shareholder.
A further issue attains the measurement of voting rights when the firm going public is part of a pyramidal group. In line with earlier studies, I consider the weakest link along the control chain. For example, if Mr. X owns 40% of firm A, which owns 50% of firm B that goes public, Mr. X (the ultimate shareholder) controls 40% of voting rights of firm B.
Cash flow rights are measured by the product of ownership stakes along the control chain. In the above example, Mr. X owns 20% of cash flow rights (40*50%). So firm B is characterized by separation of ownership from control, since Mr. X controls 40% of voting rights and has the right to 20% of cash flows.
I measure the discrepancy between cash flow and voting rights by the ratio of cash flows (O) to voting rights (C), that is:
The ratio equals 1 when there is no separation between ownership and control. The lower the ratio the higher the discrepancy between cash flow and voting rights. For instance, a ratio of 0.75 indicates that the control of a voting right is secured by investing 75% of cash flows 24 .
when the ultimate owner controls a firm indirectly through another corporation that it does not wholly control, and multiple chains, that is when the ultimate shareholder controls a firm via a multitude of control chains. In this paper, I do not make such a distinction and consider pyramids all control structures where the ultimate shareholder holds shares in the firm through one or more intermediate entities. 23 For example, pre-IPO, the shareholders of Tecnodiffusione are Panholding s.a., an unlisted firm, with a stake of 75% and Luciano Panichi with a stake of 22,54%. Since Panholding s.a. is entirely owned by Luciano Panichi, Luciano Panichi is the ultimate shareholder of Tecnodiffusione and controls 97.5% of voting rights. 24 The ratio O/C is used in previous studies ( ownership and control. For example, if the ultimate shareholder of firm X owns 5% of voting rights and 1% of cash flow rights, the wedge is 4%, while the ratio O/C equals 20%. If the ultimate shareholder of firm Y owns 50% of voting rights and 10% of cash flow rights, O/C is still 20% but wedge is 40%. A greater difference than before. In my sample, using the O/C ratio or wedge does not lead to major differences in the results, since most companies are tightly held at the IPO, as will be shown below. (38 vs. 22 years in median) and larger in size. The significant discrepancy between mean and median size is partly attributable to the presence of privatized firms in the IPO sample.
In 1992, the Italian government starts a massive privatization program of state-owned companies, reverting a long-time process that made the State pervasive in the economy also through the control of large profit-oriented companies. In this study, I define a privatization an IPO of a State-controlled firm with the declared intention to relinquish control. It differs from the flotation of other State-owned companies, 25 The high mean for financial firms largely depends on the presence of some old banks that were founded more than a century before going public. If such banks are excluded, the average (median) age of financial firms is 37 (29) , not significantly divergent from non financial ones.
where it is absent any declared intention to sell the company 26 . When privatizations are excluded, non financial firms have an average size of 385 million euro, though the median company is smaller (172 million euro). Goergen and Renneboog (2003) report an average size (measured by the market capitalization at the end of the first day of listing) of 166 million euro for German IPOs and 83 million euro for UK new listings, though they look at firms that went public over the 1981-1988 period.
New listings over the sample period occurred in waves. Besides privatizations, I identify two other categories of IPOs (Table 2) : equity carve-outs or business group-affiliated firms, and high-tech firms 27 . The first State-owned company to be privatized through a public offering is the bank Istituto Bancario S. Paolo di Torino in 1992. Most privatizations via an initial public offering occur in the period 1992-1995. Privatized firms are larger in size than other IPOs. For example, the median privatized company is 30 times larger than the median non-privatizated firm. 3 out of 8 privatizations are banks or insurance companies.
I define a business group-affiliated firm an IPO of a firm for which there exists another firm of the same group (usually the holding company) already listed. Clearly the flotation of subsidiaries is closely related to the diffusion of business groups in the Italian economy (Brioschi, Buzzacchi and Colombo, 1990; Barca et al., 1994; Aganin and Volpin, 2005) . Surprisingly, the flotation of affiliated companies is a phenomenon that strongly characterizes the Italian stock market up to the early '90s. Over the period 1985-1992 one out of two IPOs is an equity carve-out, the incidence drops to a mere 8% from 1993 on.
High-tech companies account for 12% of all IPOs and represent a recent phenomenon as 27 out of 30 firms went public over the period 1998-2005. For a wider view, the table also reports the incidence of non financial independent firms, that include all non financial, non high-tech and non business group-affiliated firms. Up to the early '90s, due to the large proportion of carve-outs, non financial independent companies account for only 36% of new listings. The percentage is reversed from '93 on as they represent almost 2/3 of all IPOs. 
Ownership structure pre-IPO
At the IPO, the ultimate shareholder controls more than 70% of voting rights (both on average and median). Only in 24% of IPOs, the ultimate shareholder does not hold the majority of votes (Table  3) . Table 4 compares categories of IPOs. In high-tech companies (Table 4 , Panel A), control is less stringent than in "mature" firms and the difference on means is statistically significant. In the median high-tech firm, the ultimate shareholder does not retain the majority of votes even before the IPO, while in the other firms the controlling shareholder has secured almost 80% of voting rights.
Control is also less concentrated in business group-affiliated than in independent firms. The evidence is in line with expectations. Though in a subsidiary, the direct largest shareholder is usually another firm of the same group that may directly control even 100% of voting rights, group-affiliated firms are often along the control chain and the ultimate shareholder owns less than 100% of voting rights at the upper levels of pyramid. Since, by construction, I consider the weakest link in the control chain in order to measure voting rights, it turns out that carve-outs are less concentrated than independent firms. Independent firms may also be part of a control chain (though no other firm of the same group is already listed), however: i) the control chain consists of few levels; ii) the ultimate shareholder has not diluted his stake in the upper levels 28 . So the portion of voting rights held by the ultimate shareholder is larger than carve-outs. 28 For instance, Snia Tecnopolimeri is a subsidiary of Fiat group, that got listed in 1986. Snia Tecnopolimeri is placed at the bottom of the control chain Ifi-Fiat-Snia BPD. Snia BPD has a direct stake in Snia Tecnopolimeri of 100%. The voting rights held by the Agnelli family (the ultimate shareholder) are: 100% in IFI, 40% in Fiat and 35% in Snia BPD. Considering the weakest link in the control chain, it turns out that Snia Tecnopolimeri is controlled at 35% by the Agnelli family. Reply is an independent firm that went public in 2000. At the IPO, the firm is controlled by Alister, Iceberg and Alika each with a direct stake of 42%, 15% and 21% respectively. Alister is controlled by Waterside Financial Limited at 99,9%, and this one is controlled by Marco Rizzante at 51%. Iceberg is fully owned by Marco Rizzante and Alika is controlled at 51% by Marco Rizzante. So Marco Rizzante is the ultimate shareholder of Reply and controls 78% of voting rights (42% through Alister, 15% through Iceberg and 21% through Alika). Table 5 analyzes the type of ultimate controlling owners. Consistent with expectations, families are the most important type and the State is the second one, testifying its non-negligible presence in the economy before the '90s. 70% of firms are family controlled and in 15% the State is the ultimate shareholder. The State extended its arms especially over banks and insurance companies. 36% of financial firms are controlled by the State versus 12% of non financial companies 29 . Considering the historical underdevelopment of the Italian capital market and the crowding-out effect exercised by the State over decades in the allocation of capital and provision of financing, the presence as ultimate shareholder of a venture capitalist in almost 9% of non financial companies is a positive surprise. All companies whose ultimate shareholder is a venture capitalist went public in the last 10 years (that is from 1995 to 2005) and in such firms, venture capitalists own the majority of votes. Table 6 reveals that a venture capitalist as ultimate shareholder occurs in 1/5 of high-tech companies, where he controls less than 40% of voting rights. Hence the increase in venture-backed IPO is recent and mainly related to the flotation of high-tech companies. A trend that, though smaller in size, reduces the distance with other western countries. Controlling less than 50% of voting rights is not only a prerogative of venture capitalists. Also families being the ultimate shareholder of high-tech companies do not hold the majority of votes (in median).
Business group-affiliated firms are controlled 29 In terms of size as measured by the value of equity immediately after the IPO, the State controls 79% of banks and 65% of non financial firms (data not reported in the table).
either by a family or by the State. The difference in the voting rights held by the two types of ultimate shareholder depends on the pyramidal structure the subsidiary belongs to. Family-controlled carve-outs are often at the bottom of the control chain and the family has already diluted its control stake at the upper levels. When the business group-affiliated firm is owned by the State, the control chain is usually shorter and the State has not significantly reduced its stake at the upper levels. In 77% of non financial (non high-tech) independent firms, the ultimate shareholder is a family, in 9% is the State, in another 9% is a venture capitalist. As previously mentioned, control in independent companies is more stringent than in high-tech firms and carve-outs. Event the venture capitalist holds on average 65% of voting rights. In business group-affiliated firms the IPO is mainly used by existing shareholders to sell part of their stakes. When considering all business group-affiliated firms issuing only existing shares or a mix of existing and new shares (74% of the sample), shares sold by existing shareholders account for 87% on average and 100% in median of all shares offered.
In high-tech companies such fraction reaches its lowest value and the IPO is used to raise new cash. Looking at high-tech companies that issue only new shares or a mix of new and existing shares (93% of the sample), new shares on average account for 35% of all shares outstanding post-IPO, the highest among all firms.
Similarly, non financial (non high-tech) independent firms undertake an IPO mainly to raise equity capital as new shares on average account for 31% of all shares outstanding ante-IPO and in the majority of such companies, existing shares represent 43% of all shares offered, significantly lower than business group-affiliated firms.
The behavior of ultimate shareholders also varies across types (Table 8) .
Family-controlled firms do not have a unique strategy when going public. When the family lists a carve-out, the decision is driven by the desire to reduce the stake held: existing shares account for 89% of all shares offered and in 87% of cases is the family at the top of the pyramid that sells shares.
In independent family firms, the main motive behind the flotation is not the desire of the controlling family to diversify its holdings, but rather the need of new financing. Offerings that consists only in existing shares account for a mere 8% of all IPOs compared to 55% of family-controlled carve-outs. The ratio of existing shares over all shares offered drop to an average of 43% (34% in median). It is also evident that 55% of existing shares are sold by family members, but in the remaining 45% are shareholders other than the ultimate owner that cash in.
Somehow in line with expectations is the behavior of venture capitalists. 84% of the offerings in which the private equity investor is the ultimate shareholder consists of a mix of new and existing shares. Shares offered reach 58% of all stocks outstanding ante-IPO. The flotation is clearly used by venture capitalists as an exit option, though partial. Existing shares account for 47% of all shares offered and in 64% of cases (71% in median) shares are sold by the private equity investor. Not only do companies whose ultimate shareholder is a venture capitalist go public to allow the private equity investor a way out from its investment, but they also use the flotation to raise further financing (or to substitute private with public financing). New shares represent 35% of all shares outstanding ante-IPO. 
Ownership structure immediately after the IPO
There is evidence that going public allows initial owners to sell shares in order to diversify their portfolios and to obtain cash either to finance future investments or to rebalance the firm's capital structure. Both of these occur at the IPO. However, though reduced, the voting rights held by the ultimate shareholder after the IPO are still substantial. Such evidence is shown in Table 9 . Post-IPO, the ultimate shareholder still retains the majority of votes and in 27% of firms the blockholder controls at least 2/3 of voting rights, a majority that gives the power to vote on non-current issues, like merger approval. Companies whose ultimate shareholder retains less than 50% of voting rights represent 36% of the whole sample (compared to 24% pre-IPO). 50% of firms whose ultimate shareholder loses majority control in the IPO are venture-backed, 10% are equity carve-outs and 3% are privatizations.
The pattern of high-tech companies contrasts with other IPOs. The ultimate shareholder of technology firms is willing to give up control when taking the company public, probably in order to raise capital to finance growth opportunities. That occurs regardless of the largest shareholder being a venture capitalist or a family. For example (not reported in the table), the stake of the family declines from an average of 57% (46% in median) ante-IPO to 42% (37% in median) immediately after the listing.
Conversely, the ultimate shareholder of non financial (non high-tech) independent companies holds on average 55% of voting rights after the IPO (57% in median) and in 28% of firms he keeps controlling at least 2/3 of voting rights. 6.3 Separating ownership and control at the IPO By going public, initial owners that want to keep control of the firm, may take actions to ensure that they will maintain their private benefits after the firm's stocks are publicly traded. For example, Field and Karpoff (2002) show that in the U.S. managers use takeover defenses at the IPO to help insulate themselves from the market of corporate control. In an attempt to dilute the investment necessary to hold the majority of votes, the initial owner may change the proportion of cash flow and voting rights he controls by the use of devices that allow so. Table 10 shows the firms with a separation of ownership from control. Before going public, 55 firms (22% of the sample) have in place a mechanism that dissociates cash flows from voting rights. In 60% of cases such firms went public before 1993. 53 out of 55 have set up pyramidal structures, the remaining two have restricted shares outstanding. In most cases firms with separation of ownership from control are family controlled and belong to a pyramidal group 30 . In thus a phenomenon mainly related to the flotation of carve-outs.
At the IPO, 8 firms (3% of the sample) separate cash flow from voting rights. 5 out of 8 are State-controlled companies. In most cases, companies go public by issuing non-voting shares 31 . It is also evident that the pattern is time dependent. 75% of firms that separate at the IPO went public before 1993. Besides, firms that by going public dissociate cash flow from voting rights represent 7% of all IPOs before 1993, and the fraction drops to 1% after 1992. The evidence sharply contrasts with that reported by Holmén and Högfeldt (2004) for Sweden. The authors find that 74% of firms that go public issue only low 30 The 2 firms with dual-class shares are State-owned banks (San Paolo di Torino and Monte dei Paschi di Siena) that at the IPO issue ordinary shares having non-voting shares outstanding. 31 The Italian law of 1974 first introduced non voting shares. Listed companies can issue such shares up to 50% of capital. Non voting shares do not give the owner any voting right, are entitled of a minimum dividend (5% of par value) and have prior claims in case of liquidation.
voting shares at the IPO. The evidence for Italian IPOs indicates that, at the flotation, very few firms use devices to separate ownership from control. This is inconsistent with the view (Bebchuk, 1999 ) that initial owners wishing to keep a lock on control, try to separate cash flow from voting rights in order to lower the costs of sub-optimal diversification and liquidity.
Evolution of ownership and control after the IPO

Changes in the ultimate shareholder
The decision to go public is clearly affected by considerations of corporate control. However the IPO may represent a first step in the shaping of ownership structure.
In the spirit of Zingales (1995) , if the aim of initial owners is to sell the company, the sale of the firm should proceed in stages, with the IPO being the first step. Hence a high turnover of control should be observed.
On the other hand, large private benefits of control may motivate original owners to retain control after the IPO (Bebchuk, 1999) . So when control is valuable, ultimate shareholders are expected to retain the majority of voting rights even years after the IPO. Table 11 shows the dynamics of control in IPO firms up to 10 years after the flotation. In 75% of firms, control does not change, that is the original ultimate shareholder retains the largest stake of voting rights in the company. A change in control occurs in 23% of firms. For 2% of firms failure, that is either bankruptcy or insolvency, is detected. In almost 30% of firms, the change in the ultimate shareholder occurs within 3 years from the IPO. Table 11 . The dynamics of control Table 11 shows in Panel A, the distribution (percentage) of firms that change ultimate shareholder and the distribution of changes in the years after the IPO; in Panel B, the distribution of firms that change ultimate shareholder by type of controlling owner; in Panel C, the frequency of changes according to the motivation behind the transfer of control for each type of ultimate shareholder; in Panel D, the frequency of changes in the ultimate shareholder in business group-affiliated and independent firms for the whole sample and for family-controlled companies. In most cases control changes involve family firms (Panel B). However, when control transfers are scaled by the number of firms within each shareholder type, it is firms with a venture capitalist as ultimate shareholder that experience most of the changes. That is not surprising as venture capitalists sell part of their shares in the IPO and in the following years divest the remaining stake from the company. Only 18% of family-controlled firms give up control. In most cases the control stake is sold to another blockholder on a friendly basis (hostile takeovers account for 12% of all family acquisitions) and in another 25% of cases the family is forced to relinquish control due to financial distress (Panel C).
What is also evident from Table 11 , Panel D is the disproportion between control changes in business group-affiliated firms with respect to independent firms and the discrepancy is even more severe (and statistically significant) among family-controlled companies. A control transfer occurs in 26% of family-controlled carve-outs that go public and only in 16% of independent firms that are controlled by a family. As previously documented by Panetta, Pagano and Zingales (1998), in equity carve-outs the ultimate shareholder is more likely to go public to relinquish control.
Previous data allow to draw some preliminary conclusions: i) most Italian IPO firms are tightly held; ii) control changes largely occur in companies with a venture capitalist as ultimate shareholder thus allowing the exercise of the exit option held by the private equity investor. In firms whose ultimate shareholders is a family: i) transfers of blockholdings mostly occur on a friendly basis through a direct bargain with a potential acquirer; ii) most changes occur in equity carve-outs.
7.2Evolution of cash flow and voting rights
If, in most cases, the Italian IPO firms do not experience a change in the ultimate shareholder, it then needs to be assessed how the ownership structure evolves. Table 12 explores the dynamics of ownership for different sub-samples of IPO firms according to different time periods after the IPO. So, for example, the sub-sample of firms that are still listed after 3 years includes all firms that went public over the period 1985-2002 for which the ownership structure can be recorded up to three years after the IPO (hence firms that went public after 2002 are excluded) and that do not change ultimate shareholder.
The evidence reveals that shareholdings are rather stable after the IPO and, most important, the ultimate shareholder maintains the majority of voting rights (both in mean and median). Even ten years after the flotation the ultimate shareholder has not reduced his stake below the control level. So the ownership structure of Italian firms does not become more dispersed over time.
The ownership of cash flow rights (Table 12 , Panel B) is lower than the control of votes, though still substantial. That's can be more clearly detected from Panel C as the O/C ratio equals on average 85%. Two further points deserve to be mentioned: i) the O/C ratio does not widen over time; ii) the discrepancy between means and medians suggests that the majority of firms does not dissociate cash flow from voting rights, but the separation of ownership from control is substantial in a minority of companies. This will be made clear below.
The dynamics in the voting rights held are common across most types of ultimate shareholders (Table 13) . Families maintain the majority of voting rights and so do financial intermediaries and foreign companies. The State keeps controlling listed companies with more than 2/3 of voting rights. The private equity investor, in the few firms in which remains ultimate shareholder, gradually dilutes its stake in the company. The previously reported gap between mean and median O/C ratios is largely due to business group-affiliated firms. Table 14 reports the evolution of the O/C ratio for carve-outs and independent firms that are family-controlled. As mentioned before, families are the ultimate shareholder in 75% of carve-outs that go public. It can easily be detected from Table 14 that in independent family firms the disproportion between cash flow and voting rights is negligible (O/C ratio is 0.96 on average). In business group-affiliated firms the separation between ownership and control is substantial (average O/C ratio is around 0.45) and tends to slightly increase in the following years. That reflects the (old-time) practice of historical families controlling vast business groups to list subsidiaries along the control chain. For such companies the separation between cash flow and voting rights is considerable even before the IPO and at the flotation widens 32 . However it is a phenomenon that has been fading away since from 1993 the listing of carve-outs is significantly reduced 33 . The overall evidence indicates that the evolution of ownership in Italy follows a pattern that significantly differs from Anglo-Saxon countries, though more aligned with other European countries.
In the US, Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1997) document that right before the IPO in only 12% of firms the largest shareholder controls more than 50% of voting rights, which reduces to 6% five years after controlled by Cofide, the holding, that is controlled at 31% by the De Benedetti family. Cofide has also non voting shares outstanding and ordinary shares account for 79% of capital. After the IPO, the direct ownership of Cofide reduces to 43%. So, before the IPO, the ultimate shareholder of Finanza & Futuro controls 31% of voting rights (the weakest link along the control chain) and has the right to 24% of cash flows (0.9693*0.79*0.31). Immediately after the flotation the De Benedetti family still control 31% of votes and has the rights to 12% of cash flows. So the O/C ratio declines from 0,76 before the IPO to 0,38 immediately after. 33 For example, the sub-sample of business group-affiliated firms whose ultimate shareholder is still in control 5 years after the IPO counts 29 companies of which only 3 went public after 1992. the IPO. Overall ownership stakes decline significantly after going public. The median ownership stake of officers and directors decreases from 68% before the initial public offering to 44% immediately afterward.
Five years after going public the median stake of officers and directors is 29%. Ten years after going public the median stake is 18%. Brennan and Franks (1997) report similar results for the U.K. Holdings of directors shift from 42% before the IPO to 35% immediately after the offering and reduce to 29% some years later. Family members that are not members of the board of directors gradually sell off from the company since their stake declines from 44% before the IPO to less than 3% some years after going public.
Conversely, post-IPO holdings of initial owners are larger in Continental Europe. In a comparison between Germany and UK, Georgen and Renneboog (2003) find that original shareholders of German IPOs on average lose majority control six years after the offering. Goergen (1998) also reports that six years after going public, families still hold majority stakes in 44% of the companies. In Sweeden, Holmén and Högfeldt (2004) find that original non-institutional owners still control 50% of voting rights five years after the IPO.
If control seems valuable in Continental Europe, it appears even more valuable in Italy. 7.3 The use of devices to dissociate cash flow from voting rights after the IPO In Italian IPOs, original shareholders do not reduce their stakes in the company by gradually selling them off to the market.
When initial owners establish an ownership structure in which they maintain control, Bebchuk (1999) suggests that separation between cash flow and voting rights will tend to be used, since such schemes enable to maintain a lock on control without requiring the controller to bear the cost of holding a large fraction of cash flow rights.
Votes can be separated from cash flows using different arrangements -dual-class shares (DCS), pyramids, cross-holdings. Table 15 shows the means used to enhance the separation of cash flow from voting rights after the flotation for a sub-sample of firms whose initial ultimate shareholder is still in control 3, 5 and 10 years after the IPO respectively.
In most of the companies with a dissociation between ownership and control, cash flows are separated from voting rights through the use of pyramids. At the IPO, more than 70% of firms with a separation have a pyramidal structure in place as they belong to business groups. However, in the years following the flotation, there is no increase in the number of firms that make use of pyramids to dissociate ownership from control.
Post-IPO, it can be detected an increase in the number of companies that create a dual-class structure by issuing non-voting shares. For example, in the sub-sample of firms whose ultimate shareholder still retains control 10 years after the IPO, 11% of companies have established a dual-class structure at the IPO and 21% ten years later. Non voting shares are also used in conjunction with pyramids, so firms belonging to a control chain when issuing non voting shares can achieve a substantial separation between ownership and control.
The data reveal a positive trend in the use of such devices. For example, in the sub-sample of firms whose ultimate shareholder is still in control 10 years after the offering, the proportion of companies that has in place an arrangement to dissociate cash flow from voting rights raises from 41% immediately after the IPO to 55% ten years later.
However such positive pattern is largely time dependent and turns out to be a practice of old-time IPOs. When considering all the listings that occurred after 1992, the use of devices to enhance the separation of ownership from control is greatly reduced. For post-1992 IPOs , it can be observed that: -companies that go public with a separation of cash flow from voting rights already in place are 9 (5% of all IPOs from 1993 to 2005); -at the IPO, only one company creates a pyramidal structure and no one issues non voting shares; -in the years following the IPO, only 3 companies (2% of all firms in the sample) set up structures that allow to dissociate cash flow from voting rights (two are banks that issue non voting shares and one is a company that takes up the non voting shares of the target company it acquires). The use of devices to separate cash flow from voting rights is thus a rare phenomenon in recent IPOs. There is no evidence that companies once public create pyramidal structures to dissociate cash flow from voting rights 34 . The practice of issuing non voting shares almost disappears. Indeed there is a trend 34 Also Franks and Mayer (2001) find that in Germany pyramidal structures are not used for control purposes, that is as a means to reduce the costs of control and extract private benefits. toward stock unifications. Among the reasons that can account for such pattern (Bigelli, 2004) , the enlargement of investors' base for the Italian stock market together with the pressure of large institutional investors for "one share-one vote" structures seem to play an important role.
Ownership and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs)
Previous evidence has shown that in the vast majority of firms that go public, the initial ultimate shareholder maintains a lock on control even in the years following the flotation. This section analyzes if IPO firms re-enter the capital market. Table 16 shows the proportion of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) for all IPO firms as well as for family and non-family controlled companies. 26% of IPO firms go back to the capital market within 3 years from the flotation and when distressed firms -that somehow may be "forced" to issue new shares -are excluded, the proportion declines to 22%. That's a figure that sharply contrasts with the 44% of Swedish IPOs documented by Holmén and Högfeldt (2004) or with the 30% of firms going public in the US as reported by Welch (1989) . There is no significant difference in the behavior of family-controlled firms with respect to other companies. Table 16 . The re-enter of the capital market after the IPO The table shows the percentage of companies conducting at least a SEO in the 3 years after the flotation for the whole sample and for the sample of family-controlled firms compared to all other firms whose ultimate shareholder is not a family. The same percentage is also shown for all firms except those that at the time of the SEO are in distress. The sample is also split in firms that change ultimate shareholder after the IPO and conduct at least a SEO and firms whose initial ultimate shareholder maintains control after the IPO and conduct at least a SEO. 0.046** ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Greater differences emerge when the sample is split between firms that change ultimate shareholder and firms that do not. What is evident from Table 16 is that firms experiencing a change in control also report a higher frequency of SEOs. For instance, looking at the whole sample, 33% of firms that change control re-enter the capital market versus 24% of firms that do not change control. But significant results occur with respect to family-controlled firms. 44% (40% if distressed companies are excluded) of family firms that change ultimate shareholder conduct a SEO within 3 years from the IPO, while only 21% (19% if distressed companies are excluded) of the firms whose ultimate shareholder maintains control re-enter the capital market.
Hence when original families remain as ultimate shareholder in the years following the IPO, they tend to go back to the capital market with less frequency.
Further evidence can be gained from the analysis of the evolution of voting rights held by the family as shown in Table 17 . Immediately after the IPO, the proportion of voting rights held by the ultimate shareholder is not significantly different among family firms, though in firms that change control and conduct a SEO, the family does not hold the majority of votes even immediately after the flotation. A sharp contrast emerges within the sample of family firms that do not change control. When family-controlled firms re-enter the capital market, the family loses the majority of voting rights though still controls a large stake. When firms do not raise new capital, the controlling family keeps retaining majority control.
That seems to suggest that whenever family firms raise new capital, the controlling family is willing to accept a dilution in its stake even if that implies losing the majority of voting rights. If the family were seriously concerned about control, it could avoid dilution by subscribing a (pro rata) portion of the new issue (as SEOs usually consists in rights offer). Instead, data reveal that majority control is preserved in family firms that do not re-enter the capital market. Though that may indicate that such firms do not need new financing or the controlling family is reluctant to put more money in the business, it may also signal that the ultimate shareholder is particularly concerned about control, even if that may lead to forgo investment opportunities. That is an issue that deserves further research. Indeed, Franzosi and Pellizzoni (2005) analyze 127 Italian small and mid caps that went public over the period 1995-2002 and find that post IPO companies keeps investing at a pace of 23% a year (statistically significant higher than 15% ante-IPO). However a re-enter of equity markets is infrequent among IPO firms; instead, leverage tends to increase after the flotation and to return to its pre-IPO levels.
Summary and conclusions
In Anglo-Saxon countries, it is commonly believed that the IPO is the start of a process that leads initial owners to lose control. Either because the original shareholders use the IPO as an exit option or because they gradually reduce their stake over time or sell to another blockholder. The history of Italian IPOs reveals that is not necessarily so.
Over the past 20 years, IPOs have occurred in waves. Up to late '80s, one IPO out of two consisted in an equity-carve out. The early '90s were dominated by large privatizations. In most recent years, most new listings are non financial independent firm and a non negligible fraction are high-tech companies, in many cases with a venture capitalist as largest shareholder.
That leads to differences in the evolution of ownership right after the IPO and in the following years, though a common feature of all firms is that they go public with high levels of control.
In business group-affiliated firms, the ultimate shareholder is more likely to go public to relinquish control. The IPO is used by the controlling shareholder to sell existing shares and equity carve-outs are more likely to change control after the flotation. Such finding supports the argument of Zingales (1995) and Mello and Parsons (1998) that the IPO is the first stage in the eventual sale of the company, at least for equity carve-outs.
A similar pattern occurs for firms with a venture capitalist as ultimate shareholder as the IPO is part of the exit strategy of the private equity investor.
However, except such firms, data show that control issues are important not only at the flotation but also in subsequent years. Though firms use the IPO to raise new capital, the fraction of shares offered is designed to allow initial owners to maintain the majority of voting rights. Shareholdings are rather stable after the flotation. Even ten years after the IPO, the ultimate shareholder has not reduced his stake below the control level. So control is particularly valuable in Italy and hardly contestable. Families appear to value control most. Control changes mainly occur on a friendly basis and, most important, only a small fraction of family-controlled firms gives up control.
To SEOas are relatively infrequent among family firms, as only one-fifth of the family-controlled companies that are not in distress go back to the equity market. Besides, family firms whose initial ultimate owner eventually sell the company to another blockholder, re-enter the capital market with a higher frequency than families whose original ultimate owner retains his stake. Families that preserve the majority of voting rights in the years following the IPO are also those that avoid raising new equity capital. Instead, when family firms conduct at least a SEO, their stake gets diluted below the control level.
It is a fact that the ownership structure of Italian firms does not become more dispersed over time. When initial owners establish an ownership structure in which they maintain control over the company, Bebchuk (1999) suggests that separation between cash flow and voting rights will tend to be used, since such schemes enable to maintain a lock on control without requiring the controller to bear the cost of holding a large fraction of the cash flow rights.
This view is not fully consistent with my findings. At a first sight, data indeed document a certain number of firms that use mechanisms to dissociate cash flows from voting rights after the IPO. Specifically, there is an increase in the creation of dual-class shares through the issue of non-voting shares, though ultimate shareholders do not appear to systematically "dilute" the investment necessary to hold the majority of voting rights. Firms do not seem either to create more pyramidal structures after the IPO, though families and the State controlling business groups used to list companies along the control chain with a high degree of separation between ownership and control even before the IPO. However that appears a characteristic of old-time IPOs. Early '90s mark a change with the past, as IPO firms stop issuing non voting shares, it is also greatly reduced the practice to list business group-affiliated firms.
That may suggest that the increased investor protection together with the pressure of large institutional investors may have reduced the chance of enjoying large private benefits and thus the incentive to separate cash flow from voting rights.
